1.1. Delegation vs. Impersonation Semantics

One common use case for an STS (as alluded to in the previous section) is to allow a resource server A to make calls to a backend service C on behalf of the requesting user B. Depending on the local site policy and authorization infrastructure, it may be desirable for A to use its own credentials to access C along with an annotation of some form that A is acting on behalf of B ("delegation") or for A to be granted a limited access credential to C but that continues to identify B as the authorized entity ("impersonation"). Delegation and impersonation can be useful concepts in other scenarios involving multiple participants as well.¶

When principal A impersonates principal B, A is given all the rights that B has within some defined rights context and is indistinguishable from B in that context. Thus, when principal A impersonates principal B, then insofar as any entity receiving such a token is concerned, they are actually dealing with B. It is true that some members of the identity system might have awareness that impersonation is going on, but it is not a requirement. For all intents and purposes, when A is impersonating B, A is B within the context of the rights authorized by the token. A's ability to impersonate B could be limited in scope or time, or even with a one-time-use restriction, whether via the contents of the token or an out-of-band mechanism.¶

Delegation semantics are different than impersonation semantics, though the two are closely related. With delegation semantics, principal A still has its own identity separate from B, and it is explicitly understood that while B may have delegated some of its rights to A, any actions taken are being taken by A representing B. In a sense, A is an agent for B.¶

Delegation and impersonation are not inclusive of all situations. When a principal is acting directly on its own behalf, for example, neither delegation nor impersonation are in play. They are, however, the more common semantics operating for token exchange and, as such, are given more direct treatment in this specification.¶

Delegation semantics are typically expressed in a token by including information about both the primary subject of the token as well as the actor to whom that subject has delegated some of its rights. Such a token is sometimes referred to as a composite token because it is composed of information about multiple subjects. Typically, in the request, the subject_token represents the identity of the party on behalf of whom the token is being requested while the actor_token represents the identity of the party to whom the access rights of the issued token are being delegated. A composite token issued by the authorization server will contain information about both parties. When and if a composite token is issued is at the discretion of the authorization server and applicable policy and configuration.¶

The specifics of representing a composite token and even whether or not such a token will be issued depend on the details of the implementation and the kind of token. The representations of composite tokens that are not JWTs are beyond the scope of this specification. The actor_token request parameter, however, does provide a means for providing information about the desired actor, and the JWT act claim can provide a representation of a chain of delegation.¶

1.2. Requirements Notation and Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

1.3. Terminology

This specification uses the terms "access token type", "authorization server", "client", "client identifier", "resource server", "token endpoint", "token request", and "token response" defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], and the terms "Base64url Encoding", "Claim", and "JWT Claims Set" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT].¶

2.1. Request

A client requests a security token by making a token request to the authorization server's token endpoint using the extension grant type mechanism defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC6749].¶

Client authentication to the authorization server is done using the normal mechanisms provided by OAuth 2.0. Section 2.3.1 of [RFC6749] defines password-based authentication of the client, however, client authentication is extensible and other mechanisms are possible. For example, [RFC7523] defines client authentication using bearer JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [JWT]. The supported methods of client authentication and whether or not to allow unauthenticated or unidentified clients are deployment decisions that are at the discretion of the authorization server. Note that omitting client authentication allows for a compromised token to be leveraged via an STS into other tokens by anyone possessing the compromised token. Thus, client authentication allows for additional authorization checks by the STS as to which entities are permitted to impersonate or receive delegations from other entities.¶

The client makes a token exchange request to the token endpoint with an extension grant type using the HTTP POST method. The following parameters are included in the HTTP request entity-body using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format with a character encoding of UTF-8 as described in Appendix B of [RFC6749].¶

grant_type

REQUIRED. The value urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange indicates that a token exchange is being performed.¶

resource

OPTIONAL. A URI that indicates the target service or resource where the client intends to use the requested security token. This enables the authorization server to apply policy as appropriate for the target, such as determining the type and content of the token to be issued or if and how the token is to be encrypted. In many cases, a client will not have knowledge of the logical organization of the systems with which it interacts and will only know a URI of the service where it intends to use the token. The resource parameter allows the client to indicate to the authorization server where it intends to use the issued token by providing the location, typically as an https URL, in the token exchange request in the same form that will be used to access that resource. The authorization server will typically have the capability to map from a resource URI value to an appropriate policy. The value of the resource parameter MUST be an absolute URI, as specified by Section 4.3 of [RFC3986], that MAY include a query component and MUST NOT include a fragment component. Multiple resource parameters may be used to indicate that the issued token is intended to be used at the multiple resources listed. See [OAUTH-RESOURCE] for additional background and uses of the resource parameter.¶

audience

OPTIONAL. The logical name of the target service where the client intends to use the requested security token. This serves a purpose similar to the resource parameter but with the client providing a logical name for the target service. Interpretation of the name requires that the value be something that both the client and the authorization server understand. An OAuth client identifier, a SAML entity identifier [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], and an OpenID Connect Issuer Identifier [OpenID.Core] are examples of things that might be used as audience parameter values. However, audience values used with a given authorization server must be unique within that server to ensure that they are properly interpreted as the intended type of value. Multiple audience parameters may be used to indicate that the issued token is intended to be used at the multiple audiences listed. The audience and resource parameters may be used together to indicate multiple target services with a mix of logical names and resource URIs.¶

scope

OPTIONAL. A list of space-delimited, case-sensitive strings, as defined in Section 3.3 of [RFC6749], that allow the client to specify the desired scope of the requested security token in the context of the service or resource where the token will be used. The values and associated semantics of scope are service specific and expected to be described in the relevant service documentation.¶

requested_token_type

OPTIONAL. An identifier, as described in Section 3, for the type of the requested security token. If the requested type is unspecified, the issued token type is at the discretion of the authorization server and may be dictated by knowledge of the requirements of the service or resource indicated by the resource or audience parameter.¶

subject_token

REQUIRED. A security token that represents the identity of the party on behalf of whom the request is being made. Typically, the subject of this token will be the subject of the security token issued in response to the request.¶

subject_token_type

REQUIRED. An identifier, as described in Section 3, that indicates the type of the security token in the subject_token parameter.¶

actor_token

OPTIONAL. A security token that represents the identity of the acting party. Typically, this will be the party that is authorized to use the requested security token and act on behalf of the subject.¶

actor_token_type

An identifier, as described in Section 3, that indicates the type of the security token in the actor_token parameter. This is REQUIRED when the actor_token parameter is present in the request but MUST NOT be included otherwise.¶

In processing the request, the authorization server MUST perform the appropriate validation procedures for the indicated token type and, if the actor token is present, also perform the appropriate validation procedures for its indicated token type. The validity criteria and details of any particular token are beyond the scope of this document and are specific to the respective type of token and its content.¶

In the absence of one-time-use or other semantics specific to the token type, the act of performing a token exchange has no impact on the validity of the subject token or actor token. Furthermore, the exchange is a one-time event and does not create a tight linkage between the input and output tokens, so that (for example) while the expiration time of the output token may be influenced by that of the input token, renewal or extension of the input token is not expected to be reflected in the output token's properties. It may still be appropriate or desirable to propagate token-revocation events. However, doing so is not a general property of the STS protocol and would be specific to a particular implementation, token type, or deployment.¶

2.2. Response

The authorization server responds to a token exchange request with a normal OAuth 2.0 response from the token endpoint, as specified in Section 5 of [RFC6749]. Additional details and explanation are provided in the following subsections.¶

2.3. Example Token Exchange

The following example demonstrates a hypothetical token exchange in which an OAuth resource server assumes the role of the client during the exchange. It trades an access token, which it received in a protected resource request, for a new token that it will use to call to a backend service (extra line breaks and indentation in the examples are for display purposes only).¶

Figure 1 shows the resource server receiving a protected resource request containing an OAuth access token in the Authorization header, as specified in Section 2.1 of [RFC6750].¶

 GET /resource HTTP/1.1
 Host: frontend.example.com
 Authorization: Bearer accVkjcJyb4BWCxGsndESCJQbdFMogUC5PbRDqceLTC

In Figure 2, the resource server assumes the role of client for the token exchange, and the access token from the request in Figure 1 is sent to the authorization server using a request as specified in Section 2.1. The value of the subject_token parameter carries the access token, and the value of the subject_token_type parameter indicates that it is an OAuth 2.0 access token. The resource server, acting in the role of the client, uses its identifier and secret to authenticate to the authorization server using the HTTP Basic authentication scheme. The resource parameter indicates the location of the backend service, <https://backend.example.com/api>, where the issued token will be used.¶

 POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
 Host: as.example.com
 Authorization: Basic cnMwODpsb25nLXNlY3VyZS1yYW5kb20tc2VjcmV0
 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

 grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange
 &resource=https%3A%2F%2Fbackend.example.com%2Fapi
 &subject_token=accVkjcJyb4BWCxGsndESCJQbdFMogUC5PbRDqceLTC
 &subject_token_type=
  urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Aaccess_token

The authorization server validates the client credentials and the subject_token presented in the token exchange request. From the resource parameter, the authorization server is able to determine the appropriate policy to apply to the request and issues a token suitable for use at <https://backend.example.com>. The access_token parameter of the response shown in Figure 3 contains the new token, which is itself a bearer OAuth access token that is valid for one minute. The token happens to be a JWT; however, its structure and format are opaque to the client, so the issued_token_type indicates only that it is an access token.¶

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 Content-Type: application/json
 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store

 {
  "access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjllciJ9.eyJhdWQiOiJo
    dHRwczovL2JhY2tlbmQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2FzLmV
    4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDQxOTE3NTkzLCJpYXQiOjE0NDE5MTc1MzMsIn
    N1YiI6ImJkY0BleGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsInNjb3BlIjoiYXBpIn0.40y3ZgQedw6rx
    f59WlwHDD9jryFOr0_Wh3CGozQBihNBhnXEQgU85AI9x3KmsPottVMLPIWvmDCM
    y5-kdXjwhw",
  "issued_token_type":
      "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
  "token_type":"Bearer",
  "expires_in":60
 }

The resource server can then use the newly acquired access token in making a request to the backend server as illustrated in Figure 4.¶

 GET /api HTTP/1.1
 Host: backend.example.com
 Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjllciJ9.eyJhdWQ
    iOiJodHRwczovL2JhY2tlbmQuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2
    FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiZXhwIjoxNDQxOTE3NTkzLCJpYXQiOjE0NDE5MTc1M
    zMsInN1YiI6ImJkY0BleGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsInNjb3BlIjoiYXBpIn0.40y3ZgQe
    dw6rxf59WlwHDD9jryFOr0_Wh3CGozQBihNBhnXEQgU85AI9x3KmsPottVMLPIW
    vmDCMy5-kdXjwhw

Additional examples can be found in Appendix A.¶

4.1. "act" (Actor) Claim

The act (actor) claim provides a means within a JWT to express that delegation has occurred and identify the acting party to whom authority has been delegated. The act claim value is a JSON object, and members in the JSON object are claims that identify the actor. The claims that make up the act claim identify and possibly provide additional information about the actor. For example, the combination of the two claims iss and sub might be necessary to uniquely identify an actor.¶

However, claims within the act claim pertain only to the identity of the actor and are not relevant to the validity of the containing JWT in the same manner as the top-level claims. Consequently, non-identity claims (e.g., exp, nbf, and aud) are not meaningful when used within an act claim and are therefore not used.¶

Figure 5 illustrates the act (actor) claim within a JWT Claims Set. The claims of the token itself are about [email protected] while the act claim indicates that [email protected] is the current actor.¶

 {
   "aud":"https://consumer.example.com",
   "iss":"https://issuer.example.com",
   "exp":1443904177,
   "nbf":1443904077,
   "sub":"[email protected]",
   "act":
   {
     "sub":"[email protected]"
   }
 }

A chain of delegation can be expressed by nesting one act claim within another. The outermost act claim represents the current actor while nested act claims represent prior actors. The least recent actor is the most deeply nested. The nested act claims serve as a history trail that connects the initial request and subject through the various delegation steps undertaken before reaching the current actor. In this sense, the current actor is considered to include the entire authorization/delegation history, leading naturally to the nested structure described here.¶

For the purpose of applying access control policy, the consumer of a token MUST only consider the token's top-level claims and the party identified as the current actor by the act claim. Prior actors identified by any nested act claims are informational only and are not to be considered in access control decisions.¶

The following example in Figure 6 illustrates nested act (actor) claims within a JWT Claims Set. The claims of the token itself are about [email protected] while the act claim indicates that the system <https://service16.example.com> is the current actor and <https://service77.example.com> was a prior actor. Such a token might come about as the result of service16 receiving a token in a call from service77 and exchanging it for a token suitable to call service26 while the authorization server notes the situation in the newly issued token.¶

 {
   "aud":"https://service26.example.com",
   "iss":"https://issuer.example.com",
   "exp":1443904100,
   "nbf":1443904000,
   "sub":"[email protected]",
   "act":
   {
     "sub":"https://service16.example.com",
     "act":
     {
       "sub":"https://service77.example.com"
     }
   }
 }

When included as a top-level member of an OAuth token introspection response, act has the same semantics and format as the claim of the same name.¶

4.2. "scope" (Scopes) Claim

The value of the scope claim is a JSON string containing a space-separated list of scopes associated with the token, in the format described in Section 3.3 of [RFC6749].¶

Figure 7 illustrates the scope claim within a JWT Claims Set.¶

 {
   "aud":"https://consumer.example.com",
   "iss":"https://issuer.example.com",
   "exp":1443904177,
   "nbf":1443904077,
   "sub":"dgaf4mvfs75Fci_FL3heQA",
   "scope":"email profile phone address"
 }

OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] already defines the scope parameter to convey the scopes associated with the token.¶

4.3. "client_id" (Client Identifier) Claim

The client_id claim carries the client identifier of the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] client that requested the token.¶

The following example in Figure 8 illustrates the client_id claim within a JWT Claims Set indicating an OAuth 2.0 client with "s6BhdRkqt3" as its identifier.¶

 {
   "aud":"https://consumer.example.com",
   "iss":"https://issuer.example.com",
   "exp":1443904177,
   "sub":"[email protected]",
   "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3"
 }

OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection [RFC7662] already defines the client_id parameter as the client identifier for the OAuth 2.0 client that requested the token.¶

4.4. "may_act" (Authorized Actor) Claim

The may_act claim makes a statement that one party is authorized to become the actor and act on behalf of another party. The claim might be used, for example, when a subject_token is presented to the token endpoint in a token exchange request and may_act claim in the subject token can be used by the authorization server to determine whether the client (or party identified in the actor_token) is authorized to engage in the requested delegation or impersonation. The claim value is a JSON object, and members in the JSON object are claims that identify the party that is asserted as being eligible to act for the party identified by the JWT containing the claim. The claims that make up the may_act claim identify and possibly provide additional information about the authorized actor. For example, the combination of the two claims iss and sub are sometimes necessary to uniquely identify an authorized actor, while the email claim might be used to provide additional useful information about that party.¶

However, claims within the may_act claim pertain only to the identity of that party and are not relevant to the validity of the containing JWT in the same manner as top-level claims. Consequently, claims such as exp, nbf, and aud are not meaningful when used within a may_act claim and are therefore not used.¶

Figure 9 illustrates the may_act claim within a JWT Claims Set. The claims of the token itself are about [email protected] while the may_act claim indicates that [email protected] is authorized to act on behalf of [email protected].¶

 {
   "aud":"https://consumer.example.com",
   "iss":"https://issuer.example.com",
   "exp":1443904177,
   "nbf":1443904077,
   "sub":"[email protected]",
   "may_act":
   {
     "sub":"[email protected]"
   }
 }

When included as a top-level member of an OAuth token introspection response, may_act has the same semantics and format as the claim of the same name.¶

7.1. OAuth URI Registration

IANA has registered the following values in the "OAuth URI" subregistry of the "OAuth Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]. The "OAuth URI" subregistry was established by [RFC6755].¶

• URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange¶
• Common Name: Token exchange grant type for OAuth 2.0¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document: Section 2.1 of RFC 8693¶

• URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token¶
• Common Name: Token type URI for an OAuth 2.0 access token¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document: Section 3 of RFC 8693¶

• URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:refresh_token¶
• Common Name: Token type URI for an OAuth 2.0 refresh token¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document: Section 3 of RFC 8693¶

• URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id_token¶
• Common Name: Token type URI for an ID Token¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document: Section 3 of RFC 8693¶

• URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:saml1¶
• Common Name: Token type URI for a base64url-encoded SAML 1.1 assertion¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document: Section 3 of RFC 8693¶

• URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:saml2¶
• Common Name: Token type URI for a base64url-encoded SAML 2.0 assertion¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document: Section 3 of RFC 8693¶

7.2. OAuth Parameters Registration

IANA has registered the following values in the "OAuth Parameters" subregistry of the "OAuth Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]. The "OAuth Parameters" subregistry was established by [RFC6749].¶

• Parameter name: audience¶
• Parameter usage location: token request¶
• Change controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 2.1 of RFC 8693¶

• Parameter name: requested_token_type¶
• Parameter usage location: token request¶
• Change controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 2.1 of RFC 8693¶

• Parameter name: subject_token¶
• Parameter usage location: token request¶
• Change controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 2.1 of RFC 8693¶

• Parameter name: subject_token_type¶
• Parameter usage location: token request¶
• Change controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 2.1 of RFC 8693¶

• Parameter name: actor_token¶
• Parameter usage location: token request¶
• Change controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 2.1 of RFC 8693¶

• Parameter name: actor_token_type¶
• Parameter usage location: token request¶
• Change controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 2.1 of RFC 8693¶

• Parameter name: issued_token_type¶
• Parameter usage location: token response¶
• Change controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 2.2.1 of RFC 8693¶

7.3. OAuth Access Token Type Registration

IANA has registered the following access token type in the "OAuth Access Token Types" subregistry of the "OAuth Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]. The "OAuth Access Token Types" subregistry was established by [RFC6749].¶

• Type name: N_A¶
• Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters: none¶
• HTTP Authentication Scheme(s): none¶
• Change controller: IESG¶
• Specification document(s): Section 2.2.1 of RFC 8693¶

7.4. JSON Web Token Claims Registration

IANA has registered the following Claims in the "JSON Web Token Claims" subregistry of the "JSON Web Token (JWT)" registry [IANA.JWT]. The "JSON Web Token Claims" subregistry was established by [JWT].¶

• Claim Name: act¶
• Claim Description: Actor¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of RFC 8693¶

• Claim Name: scope¶
• Claim Description: Scope Values¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of RFC 8693¶

• Claim Name: client_id¶
• Claim Description: Client Identifier¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 4.3 of RFC 8693¶

• Claim Name: may_act¶
• Claim Description: Authorized Actor - the party that is authorized to become the actor¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 4.4 of RFC 8693¶

7.5. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration

IANA has registered the following values in the "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry of the "OAuth Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]. The "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry was established by [RFC7662].¶

• Name: act¶
• Description: Actor¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of RFC 8693¶

• Name: may_act¶
• Description: Authorized Actor - the party that is authorized to become the actor¶
• Change Controller: IESG¶
• Specification Document(s): Section 4.4 of RFC 8693¶

A.1. Impersonation Token Exchange Example

 POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
 Host: as.example.com
 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

 grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange
 &audience=urn%3Aexample%3Acooperation-context
 &subject_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwc
   zovL2FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9vcmlnaW5hbC1pc3N1ZXI
   uZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQiLCJleHAiOjE0NDE5MTA2MDAsIm5iZiI6MTQ0MTkwOTAwMCwic
   3ViIjoiYmRjQGV4YW1wbGUubmV0Iiwic2NvcGUiOiJvcmRlcnMgcHJvZmlsZSBoaXN
   0b3J5In0.PRBg-jXn4cJuj1gmYXFiGkZzRuzbXZ_sDxdE98ddW44ufsbWLKd3JJ1VZ
   hF64pbTtfjy4VXFVBDaQpKjn5JzAw
 &subject_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Ajwt

  {
    "aud":"https://as.example.com",
    "iss":"https://original-issuer.example.net",
    "exp":1441910600,
    "nbf":1441909000,
    "sub":"[email protected]",
    "scope":"orders profile history"
  }

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 Content-Type: application/json
 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store

 {
  "access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjcyIn0.eyJhdWQiOiJ1cm4
    6ZXhhbXBsZTpjb29wZXJhdGlvbi1jb250ZXh0IiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9hcy5l
    eGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImV4cCI6MTQ0MTkxMzYxMCwic3ViIjoiYmRjQGV4YW1wbGUub
    mV0Iiwic2NvcGUiOiJvcmRlcnMgcHJvZmlsZSBoaXN0b3J5In0.rMdWpSGNACTvnF
    uOL74sYZ6MVuld2Z2WkGLmQeR9ztj6w2OXraQlkJmGjyiCq24kcB7AI2VqVxl3wSW
    nVKh85A",
  "issued_token_type":
    "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token",
  "token_type":"Bearer",
  "expires_in":3600
 }

  {
    "aud":"urn:example:cooperation-context",
    "iss":"https://as.example.com",
    "exp":1441913610,
    "sub":"[email protected]",
    "scope":"orders profile history"
  }

A.2. Delegation Token Exchange Example

 POST /as/token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
 Host: as.example.com
 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

 grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Atoken-exchange
 &audience=urn%3Aexample%3Acooperation-context
 &subject_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwc
   zovL2FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9vcmlnaW5hbC1pc3N1ZXI
   uZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQiLCJleHAiOjE0NDE5MTAwNjAsInNjb3BlIjoic3RhdHVzIGZlZ
   WQiLCJzdWIiOiJ1c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUubmV0IiwibWF5X2FjdCI6eyJzdWIiOiJhZG1
   pbkBleGFtcGxlLm5ldCJ9fQ.4rPRSWihQbpMIgAmAoqaJojAxj-p2X8_fAtAGTXrvM
   xU-eEZHnXqY0_AOZgLdxw5DyLzua8H_I10MCcckF-Q_g
 &subject_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Ajwt
 &actor_token=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczo
   vL2FzLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9vcmlnaW5hbC1pc3N1ZXIuZ
   XhhbXBsZS5uZXQiLCJleHAiOjE0NDE5MTAwNjAsInN1YiI6ImFkbWluQGV4YW1wbGU
   ubmV0In0.7YQ-3zPfhUvzje5oqw8COCvN5uP6NsKik9CVV6cAOf4QKgM-tKfiOwcgZ
   oUuDL2tEs6tqPlcBlMjiSzEjm3yBg
 &actor_token_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Atoken-type%3Ajwt

  {
    "aud":"https://as.example.com",
    "iss":"https://original-issuer.example.net",
    "exp":1441910060,
    "scope":"status feed",
    "sub":"[email protected]",
    "may_act":
    {
      "sub":"[email protected]"
    }
  }

  {
    "aud":"https://as.example.com",
    "iss":"https://original-issuer.example.net",
    "exp":1441910060,
    "sub":"[email protected]"
  }

 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
 Content-Type: application/json
 Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store

 {
  "access_token":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjcyIn0.eyJhdWQiOiJ1cm4
    6ZXhhbXBsZTpjb29wZXJhdGlvbi1jb250ZXh0IiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9hcy5l
    eGFtcGxlLmNvbSIsImV4cCI6MTQ0MTkxMzYxMCwic2NvcGUiOiJzdGF0dXMgZmVlZ
    CIsInN1YiI6InVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQiLCJhY3QiOnsic3ViIjoiYWRtaW5AZX
    hhbXBsZS5uZXQifX0.3paKl9UySKYB5ng6_cUtQ2qlO8Rc_y7Mea7IwEXTcYbNdwG
    9-G1EKCFe5fW3H0hwX-MSZ49Wpcb1SiAZaOQBtw",
  "issued_token_type":"urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:jwt",
  "token_type":"N_A",
  "expires_in":3600
 }

  {
    "aud":"urn:example:cooperation-context",
    "iss":"https://as.example.com",
    "exp":1441913610,
    "scope":"status feed",
    "sub":"[email protected]",
    "act":
    {
      "sub":"[email protected]"
    }
  }